Using a straightforward methodology, this paper assesses and estimates the trade barriers impact on exports from the Peruvian economy. The results of the analysis indicate that MFN and/or GSP tariffs rates imposed by developed countries to Peruvian exports are relatively low and, conversely, the number of NTBs and the average number of NTBs per export tariff line are relatively high. This difference produces a higher estimation of the export impact of the NTBs. An implication of these results is that the new wave of regional preferential trade agreements among developed and developing countries (which face similar trade barriers structure as the Peruvian case) may not have meaningful effects on trade flows unless it is accompanied by substantial reductions in the number of NTBs per export tariff line.
INTRODUCTION
The continual decline of tariff rates as the result of eight GATT rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 2 and the proliferation of regional preferences agreements among regions of countries has increased the relative importance of Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs 3 ) both as protection and regulatory trade instruments 4 (UNCTAD, 2005 , World Bank, 2005 . This shift on the use trade barriers instruments has originated two branches of literature: one on the measures and quantification of NTBs (e.g., BoraKuwahara-Laird, 2002 5 ) and the other on their trade impact. This paper deals with the second branch and provides on the one hand, a straightforward methodology (that could be used as a first hand tool by government authorities) to asses the trade impact of both tariffs and NTBs faced by exports firms from a particular developing country. On the other hand, it provides empirical evidence of the trade impact of these barriers for a medium size and middle-low income developing South American country, Peru. The empirical literature on the trade impact of NTBs starts in the 1970s where data was gathered and countries start to shift their standard tariff and quotas instruments (within the core measures) to other NTBs (within core and noncore measures). Surveys of this literature are found in Haveman-Nair-ReichertThursby (2003) , Maskus-Wilson (2004) , Maskus-Otsuki-Wilson (2001) , and Francois-Reinert (1997) . This in general is concentrated upon the analysis of industrialized (in particular OECD or European Community-EC) countries with mixed results in terms of the sign and the magnitude of the NTBs effects on trade flows. This paper, by analyzing one medium size developing country and using data at 6 digits level of the NABANDINA 6 classification system of Peru, attempts to eliminate estimation errors of multi-countries methodologies due to: i) the heterogeneity of the countries analyzed in previous work; ii) the difference in the degree of competitiveness factors among countries that may affect the impact of 2 The share of tariff collection out of government revenues fell from 22,4% in 1975 to 16,2% by 2004 (Fernandez-Laird-Vanzetti, 2006 . 3 The NTBs' instruments used in this paper follow the UNCTAD classification reported in TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System, UNCTAD, 2004a). The NTBs measures are codified in the Trade Control Measures Coding System (TCMCS). The system classifies the trade measures in eight groups. Wherein the code groups (of 4 digit) called the core measure are: tariff measures (1); price control measures (3); finance measures (4); quantity controls measures (6), except: i) prior authorization for sensitive product categories (617), ii) quotas for sensitive product categories (627), iii) prohibition for sensitive product categories (637); and monopolistic measures (8). The code groups called non-core measures includes: automatic licensing measures (5); codes 617, 627 and 637; and technical measures (8) . 4 The average of the number of tariff lines per country subject to at least one NTBs rose from 1879 in 1994 to 5619 in 2004 5619 in (UNCTAD, 2006 . trade barriers 7 ; iii) high level of data aggregation. In addition, the simple gravity model used here allows the estimation of an index of the export share impact of eliminating the NTBs. The paper is organized in four sections. Section 1 provides a summary of main trade barriers facing the Peruvian economy in 2002. Section 2 formulates the model specification and lists the variables and data used. Section 3 presents the main results. Concluding remarks are presented in the final Section 4. the European Union or Community 11 (EU) and the Andean Community (And.Com). In these two cases and the United States, two set of average tariffs have been computed: one from the MFN ad-valorem tariffs and the other from the GSP (Generalized Systems of Preferences) tariffs rates that these set of countries have granted to Peruvian exports 12 . For the Andean Community the tariffs reported are the 7 These factors are related to market distortions in developing countries resulting from: missing and incomplete insurance and credit markets; undersupply of public infrastructure; inadequate institutions, etc. (Stiglitz-Charlton, 2005) . 8 Note, the tariffs and non-tariffs barriers included in the computations of the figures of Tables No1  and 2, still are in force in 2006, since no new trade agreements between Peru and its export partner  countries has been implemented from 2002 to 2005. 9 Some data source contained 10 digit export tariff lines of the Harmonized and NABANDINA systems. The computations were done at the six digit level. For the 10 digit export tariff lines, a simple average of ad-valorem tariff was computed for all the ten digit export tariff lines that had the same first six digits. 10 The Peruvian export value to these countries and the EU represents 96% of the total export value of Peru in 2002. 11 The countries included in this group are: Belgium, United Kingdom, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, and Sweden. 12 The European Union have granted a GSP to countries that combat drugs (UNCTAD, 2002) . This SGP implied that only 54 Peruvian six-digit export tariff lines of the Harmonized System were subject to ad-valorem tariffs, which represented 2,1% of the total Peruvian export value of 2002. Similarly, the United States granted a GSP (called the Andean Trade Preferential Act, ATPA and thereafter ATPDEA, Andean Trade Preferential Drug Eradication Act) to Andean countries up to end of 2006. Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas N.E.
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Mining of uranium, thorium and metal ores NE. Table  No 2; v) Peruvian export of goods which face the highest number of NTBs belong to the following ISIC sectors: agricultural products, manufacture of food products and beverages, textiles, wearing apparels and chemical products;
vi) The total number of NTBs that trade partner countries impose to rest of the world is much higher than the number they imposed to exports goods from Peru. Thus, potential export firms from a developing economy, such as Peru, not only need to: search and exploit the country comparative advantage products, develop and create competitive advantage products, and overcome domestic market distortions but also need to deal with the extra costs caused by the NTBs imposed by trade partner countries.
These features of the data suggest that as a result of the GATT rounds, the regional preferential trade agreements and the generalized system of preferences (granted by large economies such as United States and the European Community), tariffs rates have been reduced close to nil for most of the main Peruvian export goods, in particular from the mining and metal ores ISIC sectors. However, the major Peruvian export partners (from both developed and developing countries) still are using nontariff measures as alternative way to impede market access, in particular, in the agricultural and manufactured sectors wherein Peru has a relative comparative advantage. Another implication of the data and as a result of the trade agreements carried out by United States and the European Community with some Latin American Countries (such as Central America, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico 16 ) is that this 'new' wave of regional agreements, which started in the 1980s (BhagwatiPanagariya, 1996; Ethier, 1998 ) between large developed economies and medium and small developing countries seems to be instruments used by developed countries for: i) replacing unilateral concessions such as the GSP tariffs for reciprocal concessions wherein in terms of ad-valorem tariff those countries might be the net winners 17 ; ii) reinforcing the establishment of the non-tariff barriers, without eliminating them; iii) and to gain concessions in other trade related areas such as trade in services, intellectual property rights and investment.
The Gravity Model Specification
For the purpose of the analysis for a particular developing country that faces trade barriers in its major exports markets, the most simple and adequate way, in theoretical terms 18 , to evaluate the trade barriers impact on the volume of trade is the gravity equation. The general model specification to be used is:
Wherein VXijt (or VMijt) is the Peruvian exports fob value (in dollars) to (or the import value of Peruvian goods of) country 'j' of goods belonging to sector or export tariff line 'i' at period 't'; Yit is the gross domestic product (GDP, in dollars) of the domestic developing country (D), Peru, which export goods from sector or export tariff line 'i' at period t; Yijt is the GDP (in dollars) of the foreign country (F), j, which import goods from the Peruvian sector or export tariff line 'i' at period t; Rikjt is the trade barrier instrument 'k' imposed by country 'j' to goods from sector or export tariff line 'i' at period t; for k=1 Ri1jt is the ad-valorem tariff rate (in percentages) and for k=2 Ri2jt is a the number of non-tariff barriers; εitj is the stochastic error; A, α1, α2, α31, and α32 are parameters to be estimated.
Even though, the analysis of an economy at 6 six digit level of aggregation of the Harmonized classification system may overcome errors of multi-country analysis due to heterogeneity of the countries, the level of country competitiveness and development, and the level of aggregation problems, however, other data disadvantages may arise. Usually, there are no time series data for tariffs and NTBs. This implies that the time series regression given in [1] cannot be estimated. To overcome this problem, equation [1] is estimated in two stages according to the following specifications: . Thus, an increase of the GDP of both exporting and importing country will increase exports (import) flows, either due to the high trade share of the differentiated and manufactured monopolistic competitive goods or to the increasing divergence in the capital and labor endowment of these countries (Evenett-Keller, 2002) or alternatively under constant elasticity of substitution between goods of the demand for imports and constant elasticity of transformation among goods in the supply of exports (Bergstrand, 1985) . For developing countries with comparative advantage in natural resources and to less extent unskilled labor, and in time series data, negative signs of parameter α1 and α2 are also feasible. Thus, an increase in the domestic (foreign) GDP, due to a higher level of capital or higher price of the import substituting products, by supply or output reallocation of resources effect or because of a higher domestic demand, will decrease exports (imports).
In the second stage cross section equation [1.3] , the α3k parameter that measures the trade impact of NTBs, could also have different signs. In the case of tariffs (i.e., k=1), under standard comparative advantage trade models, the sign of α31 is negative 20 . That is, an increase in the tariff rate of the foreign country will 19 The gravity theoretical models require assumptions such as the standard two sectors, factors and countries general equilibrium models of perfect and/or monopolistic competition with identical consumer specific preferences and constant and/or increasing returns to scale production functions in each sector. 20 Bergstrand (1990) also shows a gravity model, under intra-industry trade, that yields a negative parameter α3 for tariffs. decrease the export (or import) value of the domestic country. The impact of NTBs on trade flows (i.e., for k=2), however, will depend upon: i) the measure of the NTBs, ii) the type or group of NTBs and iii) the type of theoretical arguments of the NTBs impact. According to Bora (2003) , studies on the trade impact of NTBs related to domestic support and export subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and export cartels produces negative effects on trade flows.
Theoretical arguments, partial and general equilibrium models 21 and evidence of NTBs, related to technical standards or barriers, harmonization of international trade procedures, mostly for developed countries, yield mixture impacts. Maskus and Wilson (2004) summarize the literature for this type of NTBs. Technical standards may promote exports (imports). By adhering to compatibility requirements, countries can improve their integration with global information and telecommunications networks. On the other hand, some forms of coordination of the international harmonization of technical standards could expand market access and exports (imports) The arguments for a negative impact on exports (imports) of technical barriers are based upon: i) increasing cost of production; ii) restraining competition or create market segmentation and raising market power; iii) lack of facilities for certification and testing in developing countries; and iv) increasing transaction cost for protectionist reasons (e.g., producing inspections delays and/or imposing arbitrary fees) (Maskus and associates, 2001 ). The econometric and survey studies are also consistent with the theoretical mixture of trade impacts (e.g., OECD, 1999; USITC, 1998; Henson and associates, 2000; Swann, 1996; and Moenius, 1999 ).
An alternative approach to measure the negative impact of trade barriers on exports is by estimating, what Kee and associates (2006) called, the market access overall trade restrictiveness index. Using a multi-country complex econometric methodology and the theory of the trade restrictiveness indices (e.g., Anderson and Neary, 1992 , 1994 and 1996 to the set of trade barriers faced by Peruvian exporters (from the rest of the world) increases from 10,8% to 16,5 % when NTBs are taken into account. This means that the tariff effect of NTBs increases in more than 50% the equivalent tariff resulting from the effect of tariff barriers. As it is shown below, this result is consistent with the estimations obtained with the simple one-country methodology presented in this paper.
Regardless of these different approaches and evidence, the maintained conjecture in this paper is that the trade flows impact of a NTB is always negative for firms from developing countries whenever the NTB: i) produces international markets distortion; ii) is conclusively a protectionist barrier; and iii) yields a long run benefit for firms due to standards harmonization or shared standards. In the first two cases, the NTB need to be eliminated. In the third case, the short run impact may be still negative due to the fact that firms in developing countries face a set of domestic distortions that limit or distort the comparative and competitive advantage of the country 23 . Standard harmonization, shared or not, and coordination among countries, even if in the long run could have a positive impact, in the short and/or transition period, it adds an extra cost for developing countries' exporters and potential firms that could deter even further the access to foreign markets 24 . In this case, due to the asymmetry among firms' degree of development and/or the potential inequality of the trade gains distribution that it might arise due to those standardization efforts, a redistributive mechanism need to be created in order to eliminate the additional costs for developing countries firms.
Trade barriers impact estimations of equations [1.1]-[1.3] can be summarized using the exports impact indexes. Here, two indices are defined: the partial impact index and the total impact index. In the first case, the index measure the change of the country export share of sector 'i' (out the total Peruvian export value) when the tariffs and/or the number of NTBs of the export tariff lines of that sector, imposed by country 'j', is reduced by one unit. The total impact index measures the changes of the same export shares when all the tariffs and/or NTBs of country 'j' are completely eliminated in that sector. When the sector 'i' is the total Peruvian export sector, the partial export impact index is defined by equation Where Skj is the share of the exports value of the export tariff lines with positive trade barrier k out of total (Peruvian) export value to country j; Sj is the share (multiplied by 100) of the value of exports to country j out of total country export value and α3kje are the estimated coefficients from regression equation [1.3] . The total export impact index is defined by:
Wherein Rkaj is the weighted average 25 of the trade barrier k imposed by (the foreign) country j to goods from Peru (the domestic country).
The export impact indices, partial and total, for changes of the trade barriers of the h sector from country j are, analogously, defined respectively by: Where Skhj is the share of export value of sector h with a positive trade barrier k out of the total export value of sector h; Sh, is the share of the export value of sector h to country j out of the total export value to country j; Rakhj is the weighted average of the trade barrier k imposed by country j in sector h. It is clear from these indices, that to extent that tariffs barriers (i.e., k=1) have been reduced (i.e., S 1 hj=S 1 j=Ra 1 hj=Ra 1 j → 0) the NTBs are barriers that may produce the higher levels of exports impact in developing countries. . Tariff rates and NTBs are the same for any of these countries. Also, for each country and the main export partners of the European Union, have been estimated the regression coefficients of equation [1.3] from sectors with feasible number of observations (i.e., numbers of export tariff lines) for estimation purposes, and in which Peruvian exporters face variables advalorem tariff rates and/or meaningful numbers of NTBs.
Estimations and Results

Tables
Although, statistically the estimation results for the first stage equation [1.1] are relative weak, the sign of the estimated coefficients seem to be consistent with Peruvian comparative advantage in natural resources and unskilled labor and foreign country comparative (e.g., in capital goods or unskilled labor) and competitive advantages.
GDP Coefficients
Trade Except for Chile, the share of Peruvian exports which face NTBs (out of the total export value to a country) is higher that the respective share of exports which face tariff barriers;
ii)
The main Peruvian export partners from developed countries (with or without SGP) are using NTBs as the main instruments to limit market access to Peruvian exports. On the other hand, the main Peruvian export partners from developing countries are still using tariff barriers as the main trade barrier to limit market access of Peruvian goods 29 ;
iii) The main Peruvian export partners from developed countries use at least one type of trade barrier whenever the other type is reduced or eliminated. Thus, the lower the average tariff rate (or the number of NTBs per export tariff line) in a sector, the higher the average number of NTBs per export tariff line;
iv) Elimination of all NTBs from the major Peruvian export partners from developed countries it is estimated to increase the export share value of exports in more than a double (i.e., 38,9%) that the increase of this share in the case that all ad-valorem tariff rates are eliminated (i.e., 15,2%) in those countries. This result is a direct consequence of the lower level of the tariffs rates (i.e., in average lower than 2,7%).
These results suggest that regional trade preferential agreements between developed and developing countries, with similar trade barriers structure as in the Peru economy, may not promote exports and GDPs, in a meaningful way, in these developing countries
30
. The exports impact of those agreements will be higher if both tariff and NTBs are simultaneously eliminated or alternatively, if tariffs rates and distorting NTBs are eliminated and standards harmonization and countries coordination, which produces long run positive exports impact, are implemented with some kind of transfer mechanism from developed countries to developing countries export firms that avoid the extra cost caused by the harmonization and coordination of these standards. 28 Only regressions coefficients from Japan produce a positive impact of the NTBs. 29 Contrarily, the Andean countries even though has practically eliminated the ad-valorem tariff rates among members of the Andean agreement, still are imposing a high number of NTBs (Table No 2 ).
Conclusions and Final Remarks
This paper has presented a straightforward methodology that can be used (by country authorities) as a first hand tool to assess and estimate the trade barriers impact on exports faced by a particular developing country. The methodology uses few and feasible variables that are found in standard statistics from developing countries and trade data at 6 digits level of aggregation of the harmonized classification system. The application of this methodology to the Peruvian case yields consistent results to multi-country sophisticated methodologies (e.g., Kee and associates, 2006) . The main results of the trade barriers analysis and their export impact for the Peruvian economy are:
• The increased importance of NTBs (as protectionist and regulatory trade instruments) and the continual decline of tariff rates resulted from the eight GATT rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and the proliferation of regional preferences agreements among regions of countries have implied that by 2002, more than 70% of the total Peruvian exports (to the main trade partners 31 ) face low levels of ad-valorem tariff rates simultaneously with relative high levels of the number of NTBs and the average number of NTBs per export line.
• Tariff and NTBs faced by Peruvian exports of goods, in particular from developed countries are concentrated on agricultural products, manufacture of food products and beverages and textiles;
• Both, tariff and NTBs, are estimated to have a negative impact on Peruvian exports of goods. This impact is consistent with theoretical arguments, partial and general equilibrium models and previous empirical evidence and with more complex methodologies which are extensive in the use of data sources and variables.
These results suggest that the new wave of regional preferential trade agreements among developed and developing countries, which face similar trade barriers structure as the Peruvian exports, may not have meaningful effects on trade flows unless that is accompanied by substantial reductions in the number of NTBs per export tariff lines.
